

NSC review completed

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ROUGH NOTES of Rostow Committee, Morning of 26 October 1962

---A. Rostow outlined three courses of US action, to be pursued concurrently.

1. The political line. This begins with the latest version of the U Thant proposal and includes the Brazilian resolution on a nuclear-free zone and a possible summit. The objective is to get the missiles out, to give up nothing for it, but to provide the Soviets with such face-savers as we can. Within Rostow's purview, [redacted] is chief planning officer on this.

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2. The military line. This is a series of actions leading up to an air strike, which should in the meantime be ready on an emergency basis. A further elaboration is needed of an Executive Committee paper which states the pros and cons of a strike plus the political pre-conditions for undertaking it. [redacted] is responsible for this scenario, will work with DOD, and will draw on today's ISA paper as a source of suggested intermediate steps.

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3. The economic line. This is based upon a POL embargo. Rostow believes that existing estimates underrate the economic effects of this. He lays more stress, however, on the political effects of this move as demonstrating our determination and setting a terminus for the regime which will influence the immediate and continuing estimates of Castroites and the Soviets. Thus this line is designed to crack Cuba politically from within. Bob Hurwitch is in charge.

---B. "Scenarios" on all these lines are to be prepared today and thereafter, perhaps tomorrow, a unified scenario will be done. The common elements or guiding principles governing all three courses are: a focus on the existing missiles as the issue; a steady increase of pressures; a political position which offers the Soviets not concessions but some face-saving device, and the failure of which would justify unilateral action.

---C. Hurwitch has an additional task: to head a continuing interagency assessment of stability in Cuba. This is to include representatives of the DD/P and DD/I and is to have completed by c.o.b. today an assessment of the situation in Cuba in the light of events of this week and recommendations for the exploitation of vulnerabilities. INR and USIA are to participate.

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---D. CIA was asked to prepare a short statement on the ability of the Cubans to operate the Soviet missiles, either conventional or nuclear, if they overwhelmed Soviet guards. I have passed this on to OSI (through Gail Stringham) with instructions to send replies directly to Rostow and

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*New York Herald Tribune
Tuesday, October 30, 1962*

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New York Herald

BEHIND THE LINES

By Warren Rogers Jr.

WASHINGTON.

When Congress comes back in January, one of the first questions it will ask will be this: how good is our military intelligence on Cuba and Russia?

Kennedy administration officials have been saying all along that it is very good. They have produced supporting evidence, including the remarkably clear aerial photographs and a good deal of precise information gained through other means.

The Administration has not told all it knows about the Soviet shipment of offensive weapons shipped to Cuba. It has told only enough to make its point. For example, this reporter knows the United States had extremely accurate knowledge of what was in those Soviet ships, and the Russians knew we knew. This is not the sort of knowledge to be gained through aerial photography and so the obvious inference is that the United States has agents in the ports from which the cargo was shipped.

But this is after-the-fact intelligence. Congress will want to know, for example, how the Russians managed to get the rockets to Cuba in the first place and it will ask why the existence of such rockets in the Soviet arsenal was not known in advance—or, if it was known, why this was not made public.

Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara has said the medium-range and intermediate-range Soviet missiles are unlike anything the United States possesses. Congress will be asking why this is so. The question is particularly pertinent because Gen. Lauris Norstad, NATO Supreme Commander, has been pressing for two years for a mobile medium-range missile like the one the Russians sent to Cuba. Gen. Norstad had been scheduled to retire Nov. 1, but is staying in his post until Jan. 1 because of the Cuban crisis.

Mr. McNamara has been cool to the idea. He says such a weapon would cost about \$2 billion and is of doubtful value. But he offered to build one if the NATO countries would pay for it. So far, it has reached only the first stage, "program definition." This makes it too tenuous to be included in the new Defense budget unless it becomes a more urgent matter.

FIVE MEN BEHIND THE SCENES

Five men who don't like to get their names in the paper were the key figures behind scenes in the cat-and-mouse game of collecting and analyzing the intelligence data on Cuba. They are:

—Air Force Lt. Gen. Joseph F. Carroll, chief of the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency. A former top assistant to FBI director J. Edgar Hoover, Joe Carroll is a brilliant intelligence officer. When the Air Force was organized 15 years ago he created its intelligence branch. When DIA was formed a year ago, unifying military intelligence for the first time, he was a natural to head it.

—Army Lt. Gen. William W. Quinn, Joe Carroll's deputy. "Buffalo Bill" Quinn, a football and lacrosse star at West Point in the 1930s, is a tough combat commander, a former chief of Army information, and a highly capable intelligence expert.

—Rear Adm. Samuel B. Frankel, Joe Carroll's other deputy. He speaks Chinese and Russian and is an expert on Red China and the Soviet Union. In his career, too, has centered on intelligence.

—Gen. Marshall S. Carter, deputy direc-



Associated Press

TALK TEAM—Two of the three named by President Kennedy yesterday to handle negotiations with Cuba were, left, Under Secretary of State George Ball, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell L. Gilpatric. John McCloy will head the group.

tor of the Central Intelligence Agency. "Pat" Carter served on the Marshall mission to China after World War II, as a military aide in Europe with the rank of minister, and as a member of U. S. delegations to international conferences in Rio de Janeiro, Bogota and Mexico City.

—Adm. Jerauld Wright, former commander of the Atlantic Fleet, and currently, by special act of a Congress, a full-time consultant to the CIA. His long Naval career involved him intimately with NATO and Caribbean affairs and made him especially valuable during the Cuban crisis.

These men will be queried on Capitol Hill during the "military posture" hearings in January. How they answer may well determine, among other things, how fast or slow Secretary McNamara may hereafter proceed with his program to unify the armed forces.

FIRST REAL UNIFICATION TEST

Cuba was the first real test of unification. If it is found that unified intelligence did a better job than the three services could have done individually, Congress will look more favorably on unification in other fields. If not, the selling job McNamara had done will come unglued.

Other questions are tantalizingly persistent. For example: if the Russians could suddenly come up with a highly mobile missile with a 1,100-mile range and also a hitherto unheard-of missile with a 2,200-mile range, what did they do to achieve it? Did they take existing rockets and give them added range by making the nuclear warhead smaller (since there is a direct ratio between range and weight of payload)?

If so, of what effect will this have on Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles? Will the Russians be able to do what the United States has done—that is, build a lot of small-yield ICBMs, and even put them on sub-marines? If so, will this hasten the day of nuclear stalemate, when the American umbrella of nuclear superiority will no longer prevail?

Much secret data on these points plus pictures far clearer than those made public will be turned over to the NATO Council at its December meeting. The NATO Council may be forced to make new decisions, in light of obvious Soviet gains in medium-range and intermediate range rocketry.